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Washington,

When the Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration rendered its
final decision at Paris on the fourteenth of last August, a
resolution was adopted permitting each individual Arbitrator
.to file with the Secretary of the Tribunal a separate opinion
upon the matters submitted to it for determination, and a
period of several months was allotted for this purpose. One
-of the opinions filed under this resolution was written by
Justice HARLAN of the Supreme Court of. the United States,
who was one of the two Arbitrators representing our Government in the Tribunal of Arbitration, and this opinion has been
recently published by the Government Printing Office at
Washington. The earlier part of the volume contains some
remarks which Justice HARLAN made in private conference
with the other Arbitrators, in support of the two propositions
that the Tribunal was invested with authority under the
Treaty of February 29, 1892, between Great Britain and the
United States, first, to adopt regulations which, for a certain
period in each year, should entirely prohibitpelagic sealing and
not merely restrict it; and second, to extend these regulations not only to Bering Sea, but also to the North Pacific.
It is of interest to note that Justice HARLAN'S views on both
of these points were adopted unanimously by the Tribunal.
of Arbitration, and subsequently were embodied .in their
decision.
The second of the two parts into which this volume is
divided contains a formal opinion by Justice HARLAN upon the
merits of the entire controversy. Of the five questions of law
submitted to the Tribunal of Arbitration for determination, the
first four related to certain extraordinary rights of marine
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jurisdiction which, it was alleged, the United States derived
from Russia at the time of the purchase of Alaska. It is a
noteworthy fact that the opinion of Justice HARLAN upon these
four points was in accordance with that of the majority of the
Arbitrators (Senator Morgan only dissenting), and was adverse
to the claims of the United States. Justice HARLAN held in
substance that by the Ukase of 1821 Russia did not assert
any jurisdiction over Bering Sea except for a distance of IOO
miles from the coast, and that this jurisdictional claim was
never enforced in practice, but on the contrary was withdrawn
as to the United States by the Treaty of 1824, and as to
Great Britain by the Treaty of 1825. He held further, in
answer to the second point, that Great Britain never recognized or conceded any claim by Russia of exclusive jurisdiction in Bering Sea, or over the seal fisheries, outside of territorial waters; and, in answer to the third -point, that when in
the Treaty of 1825 Russia conceded to the citizens of Great
Britain full rights of fishing and of navigation in the " Pacific
Ocean," this phrase included Bering Sea, and the Ukase of
1821 was thereby rescinded so far as it might be regarded as
affecting the present question. The fact that Justice HARLAN
felt constrained to concur with the foreign members of the
Tribunal in deciding these questions adversely to the United
States may be regarded as a proof of the most positive kind
that the decision reached by the Arbitrators upon these points
was correct.
With respect, however, to the fifth and last of the points
submitted to the Tribunal of Arbitration, Justice HARLAN did
not concur with a majority of the Arbitrators, and the present
volume contains his dissenting opinion fipon this question. A
majority of the Tribunal decided that the United States had
not a right of property in the fur seals when found beyond
territorial limits, and that it could not lawfully protect the
seals in the open sea. Justice HARLAN in his dissenting
opinion maintains the opposite of both of these propositions.
He contends that in international law, just as in the development of the common law, new cases which are lacking in
direct precedents should be determined in accordance with
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our sense of natural justice; and he quotes Kent and numerous other text writers in support of the view that there is an
international morality underlying the principles of international
law as they are being developed with the advance of civilization. He thinks that these principles can. be deduced in
many instances from analogies to be found in the municipal
law of particular nations, and he traces a similarity between
seals on the one hand, and such animals as bees, pigeons and
deer, on the other hand, all of which were protected as private
property by the Roman law and the common law of England,
because of their having an animus revertendi. He asserts
that the United States by maifitaining and protecting the
extensive breeding grounds of the seals on the Pribyloff
Islands, at great expense, and for the purpose of making these
animals subserve the interests of commerce and manufacture,
has thereby exercised such control over them as would give to
our Government a permanent right of property in the seal
herd, even while temporarily absent from our territory upon
the high seas. Justice HARLAN then discusses the question
as to whether, assuming that the United States does not have
a right of property in the seals, it can lawfully protect them
from attack beyond its territorial limits, and reaches the conclusion that such protection in lawful upon the theory that it is
an act of national self-preservation. He contends that a
nation so protecting its lawful industries does not thereby
appropriate to itself any part of the ocean, or interfere with
the innocent use of the high seas for other purposes. It only
prevents a form of wrong doing and preseryes what no one
has a right to destroy. He concludes his bpinion by citing
several striking precedents from the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court, foreign treaties and other sources,
which tend to establish the right of a nation to -assert its
sovereignity and defend its interests upon the high seas outside of the three-mile limit.
It is to be regretted on many accounts that the opinion of
Justice HARLAN upon these points did not obtain the concurrence of a majority of the Tribunal, for it is almost impossible
to read his able and lucid discussion of this question without
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sharing his conviction that the United States does possess a
right of property in the seals, and that it can lawfully protect
that right. However, the contrary decision of the Arbitrators
is of less importance than it otherwise would be for the reason
that they established a set of regulations for the protection of
the seals, which there is every reason to believe will fulfill the
objects sought by the United States when the Treaty of Arbitration was signed. To these regulations Justice HARLAN gave
his hearty concurrence.
R. D.

A

TREATISE ON EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF,

IN EQUITY AND AT

By THOMAS CARL SPELLING. Covering Injunctions,
Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto,
Certiorari. Containing an exposition of the principles governing these several forms of relief, and of their practical
use, with citations of all the authorities" up to date. In two
volumes. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1893.
LAW.

If well done the practical use of such a treatise as this
before us goes without saying. The work is no modern digest
in text book form. It presents the law on each subject in a
clear and entertaining manner. Every principal is critically
explained. The notes are complete and render the book of
great practical value as a reference to pertinent cases. The
principle merit of the work is found in the text. Ordinarily,
modern text books seem to have been written by persons who
consider that all that is necessary to write a law book was to
take the sylabi of all the cases, which, by any possibility could
be said to relate to the subject, and arrange them in some sort
of logical or illogical order, putting in a word here and there
t6 prevent the whole from appearing too strikingly what it
really is-nothing but a digest. Digests on any subject are
valuable, and have their place, but the class of work, like the
one before us, which carefully explains the principles of the
law which the cases illustrate, and makes a careful selection of
the illustrations used, have infinitely more use, and are works
of a great deal higher order.
The first volume is entirely devoted to injunctions. On
-
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examining the index to this subject, which is printed separately
from the index to the rest of the book, we could not find anything relative to injunctions to restrain strikes and property in
the hands of receivers. This seems to us to be rather an important omission, if it has been omitted, and not overlooked
by us. We would be interested to know how one, who seems
to hav6 so closely studied the general principles of injunctions,
would regard this their new application. We also think Mr..
SPELLING has lost an opportunity when he failed, critically, to
discuss the quession of injunctions to restrain libel. The discussion on this subject, which we find on page 710, Volume I,
is good, but evinces a certain amount of timidity on-the part
of the writer in that he fails to point out irreconcilable cases.
For instance, how can we reconcile the case of Mauger v.
Dick, 55 Howe, N. Y., Pr. 132, in which it was said that an
injunction does not lie to restrain a manufacturer of goods
from issuing circulars to dealers in such -goods charging that
the plaintiff is offering for sale imitations of the goods and
threatening prosecutions, with the case of Springhead Spinning Company v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq., 551, where workmen were restrained from placarding notices advising their
fellow workmen not to hire themselves to the plaintiff because
there was a strike on in the plaintiff's shop. Again, how can
we reconcile the former case with that of Emack v. Kane,
34 Fed. Rep. 46, where the defendants were restrained from
issuing a circular in which they threatened to bring suit against
the plaintiff for an infringement of patent. We point out these
examples because we believe that they illustrate a very serious
defect in a good work. What a lawyer wants, when he turns to.
a text book to aid him in preparing a brief, is either merely a
digest to refer him to all the cases or a critical discussion of
those cases. It does not seem to us that the half-way text
book meets any real need. The text book, for instance, which
merely states principles. A good digest does this, and illusstrates those principles by more copious examples than we can
hope to find in a text book which pretends to state principles
and use cases as illustrations. We do not mean to say that
Mr. SPELLING'S work is in a position of being halfway between
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a digest and a critical discussion. It is much nearer a complete critical discussion of the subject with which he deals.
Our only complaint is that in this critical discussion and
development of the different subjects he has not gone quite
far enough. He seems to have tried to reconcile authorities
rather than to point out their irreconcilable elements. With
all, however, it is an excellent book-far, very far, above the
average text book which we have to review. Especially welcome is the discussion of the writ of certiorari, this being the
only scientific discussion of this writ vhich we know of, a certain work labeled " Certiorari," which was noticed in our
columns some months ago, not being worth speaking of.
Volume II, besides containing certiorari, has a discussion of
habeas corpus, mandamus, and quo warranto. This volume,
from its very nature, is more interesting than Volume I. We
have other good works on injunctions, but for the other subjects, Mr. SPELLING has probably writtena work which is more
useful than any other which we know of.
The paper and typography, like all other volumes, from the
same press, are above criticism.
W. D. L.
HoW

TO USE THE

FORCEPS.

With an introductory account of

the Female Pelvis and the Mechanism of Delivery. By
HENRY G. LANDIS, A. M., M. D. Revised and enlarged by
CHARLES H. BuSHOxG, M. D.
Illustrated. New York:
E. B. Treat, Publisher, 5 Cooper Union.
Lord COKE has justly observed that in the ashes of the law
lie buried the sparks of all sciences. The subject of malpractice must ever be one of interest and importance to practitioners of the law; and from this aspect the above entitled
work will prove useful to lawyers, though, of course, its
especial field of usefulness lies in the domain of medicine.
MARSHALL D. EWELL, M. D.
The Kent Law School of Chicago.

A

PRACTICAL TREATISE ON NERVOUS EXHtAUSTION (Neurasthenia), Its Symptoms, Nature, Sequences, Treatment. By
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GEORGE M. BEARD, A. M., M. D., Edited with Notes and
Additions by A. D. ROCKWELL, A. M., M. D. Third
Edition-Enlarged. New York: E. B. Treat, Publisher,

5 Cooper-Union.

1894.

This book is one which every brain-worker, and especially
every law'er, should read; not with the idea of becoming his
own medical adviser, or of self treatment, but for the purpose
of becoming acquainted with the symptoms of nervous
exhaustion, so common among lawyers, and thereby avoiding
,danger.
Having been obliged almost entirely to suspend professional
work for nearly three years we speak feelingly on this !ubject
when we say that an ounce of prevention is better than a
pound of cure. The greater part of the evil effects of nervous
exhaustion are due to ignorance and might, with a very small
-amount of knowledge correctly applied, be easily obviated.
We can cordially commend this book.
MARSHALL D. EWELL, M. D.
The Kent Law School of Chicago.

A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LIENS, COMMON LAW, STATUTORY,
EQUITABLE AND MARITIME. By LEONARD A. JONES. Second
Edition. Revised and Enlarged. In Two Volumes. Boston
and New York: Houghton, Mifflin & Company. The
Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1894.

Prior to the first edition of this work it is a question whether
any other branch of the law could lay claim to an equal lack of
clear comprehension. A " lien" has always r'presented to the
mind of the average man (and to only too many lawyers), the
idea of a charge upon property, of any and all kinds and
descriptions, even as to the newspaper omniscient ' defalcation" is a digiified species of embezzlement. Accordingly,
side by side with the liens of attorneys, etc., we hear men
speak of the lien of a mortgage. ah assignment, a judgment,
etc., etc., Even in that great fountain of law, the Acts of
Assembly, such confusion of terms is the invariable rule. It
would be difficult to find a statute that speaks of the "encum-
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brance" of a mortgage, or of a judgment. And yet, as Mr.
Jone,; clearly shows, this general, popular nomenclature is,
as it is very apt to be, wholly in the wrong. The so-called
"1liens" of this kind find, therefore, no place in this work; and
the unsuspecting lawyer 'who turns to it for information on
tlioze subjects will be disappointed, even though his mental
horizon may be enlightened in another direction.
What, then, is a " lien," within the scope of this work ? It
mist be confessed that, though the several species of liens are
dcined with great clearness, the broad line of distinction
),.tween a '-lien" in general and a charge on property is left
in a hazy state. But probably this was inevitable. It is hard
to.find a definition which will include common law, statutory
and equitable, to say nothing of maritime liens. "A lien at
law," says the author, "is an implied obligation whereby
property is bound for the discharge of some debt or engagement. It is not the result of an express contract; it is given
by implication of law." Now it is clear that this definition cannot be applied to- a statutory lien, which is given by
the express words of a statute, unless we regard the statute as
implied in the agreement between the parties. So, too, an
equitable lien, which arises from express words in a contract,
cannot be classed under 'this definition. An example will
make this clearer. At common law an innkeeper has a lien on
the goods of his guest until his charges are paid. The guest
may contract with him that he shall retain a special part of
his baggage. This discharges the lien on the rest, and creates
an equitable lien on the part so retained. Again, a lien on the
property of a guest may be declared by statute, which will
supersede the common-law lien. In each case the result is the
same, but the three liens are totally different in their origin.
The most general definition of a lien that Mr. Jones gives is,
that it is a right of detainer. This, however, only applies to
personal property, and not to a mechanic's, or other lien on
real estate. A lien 6n personal property can in general only
attach to property in the possession of the lien-holder, and
which he can detain; but the mechanic is not in possession of
the real estate to which his claim attaches.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Without going into the subject farther it may suffice to say
that the most satisfactory definition of a " lien" in the strict
sense is, that it is a fixed charge upon specific property, not
coupled with an interest. This Mr. Jones clearly implies,
though he does not state it in so many words.
There is very little that has escaped the author's research;
and he has fo-tunately not felt himself tied down to a bare
statement of the express decisions on any subject, but has
gone in most cases into a more or less detailed discussion of
collateral points, tending to elucidate questions not yet decided,
but which may arise. The chapter on the Lien of a Finder of
Lost Goods is a clear illustration' of this. After stating that at
common law the finder has no lien, he does not merely agd
that if a reward has been offered the finder has a lien for the
reward; but goes on to discuss the incidents of the offer, when
it becomes a contract, what constitutes a p6rformance of its
terms, when the offer may be withdrawn, etc., until he hascovered almost every cbnceivable question that can be raised.
And yet, there are some matters which Mr. Jones has either
failed to notice, or considered as beneath his notice. It is
rather depressing to local pride to find no mention of
Cadwalader v. Dilworth, 26 W. N. C., 32, the sole case in
which a court has decided that an agistorhas a lien at common
law upon a horse which he has taken to board. However,
opposed as that case is to an overwhelming array of authorities, its citation would have served no good purpose, except as
showing the presumable opinion on that subject in Pennsylvania.
There are some slight inaccuracies and deficiencies of statement to be found here and there. In discussing lumbermen's
liens the author states (§ 722), that "the contractor is not in
general an agent of the owner to employ men and bind the
owner or his property." But he omits to. state that this rule
depends wholly on the .nature and terms of the contract (in
other words, whether or not the contractor is to be regarded
as independent). If he is not independent, but under the
control of the owner, authority to employ men on -behalf of
the latter will, in the - absence of express restrictions, be
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infer:ed from the contract. It is clear, therefore, that no
general rule can be predicated where *it depends on the circumstances of the particular case.
So, he states in § 1033 that the lien-holder who sells the,
property subject to the lien may set up the lien as a defence to
any action which the owner may bring agaiist him for a conversion. But this, as shown by §§ 523 and 525, is only
partially true. In any case the lien couild only serve as a.
defence pro tanto; that is, as a set-off. And he does not state
the fatt, decided in one of the very cases he cites, that the
purchaser of the property may set up the lien as a defence to
an action of replevin brought by the owner, he being in this
regard substituted to the rights of the lien-holder.
Again, in discussing the vendor's lien upon real estate for
unpaid purchase money, while rightly omitting Pennsylvania
from the list of States in which that lien is recognized, the
author also omits to state that it was nevertheless decided in
Stokely v.. Trout, 3 Watts, 163, that whenever the agreement
between the vendor and vendee contemplates another deed,
though in the words of a present conveyance, the vendor has a
lien for the unpaid purchase money.
And again, in treating of the effect which an agreement by
the principal contractor not to file a mechanic's lien has upon
the right of a sub-contractor, though correctly stating the law
to be that a covenant to that effect by the contractor will bind
the sub-contractor, he overlooks the decision in Evans v.
Grogan, I53 Pa., 121, that to have that effect, it must be a
covenant in the strict. sense, not a mere promise that liens shall
not be filed.
All these errorA, however, are but of minor importance
compared with the value of the work as a whole, and are such
only as are inevitable in any human performance. No other
work on the subject can compare with this in logical arrangement, clear style, or accurate statement. The chapters on
Mechanics' Liens, which form over two-thirds of the text of
the second volume, contain a presentment of the law on that
vexed subject that is without a rival. After their perusal, one
can say with confidence that he knows something about the

BOOK REVIEWS.

subject, a statement which would have been rash, indeed,
before Mr. Jones gave us the fruit of his labors. The same
might be said of other portions of the work.
A very valuable feature is the abundant presentment of
statute law, a feature which was really rendered essential by
the nature of the subjects treated; but it is matter for regret
that the references are too often made to compilations only,
and not to the annual volumes of laws. An index of statutory law, though involving much additional labor, would have
been an important adjunct to the work.
The index, too, might have been fuller. As it is, it savors
too much of the logical arrangement of the work,- and not
enough of the alphabetical nature of an index proper. You
will find the titles "contractor" and "sub-contractor" safe and
sound under the shelter of "Mechanics' Liens," but will look
for them in vain in their alphabetical place: So with many
other subjects.
It is also disappointing to find the subject of municipal liens
dismissed with a cursory reference to the liens of taxes and
water rents. These are certainly matters of great importance,
and fall as legitimately within the scope of the work as do
Mechanics' Liens. It may be, however, that the author felt
himself restrained within the bounds of the property relations
between private individuals, in which case the liens of the
public would not strictly belong to the subject in hand. Yet,
treated as Mechanics' Liens have been, it would have greatly
-enhanced the value of the work; and we may be permitted to
-express the hipe that in the future the author may turn his
hand to this subject also.
R. D. S.
R
FORMS IN CONVEYANCING AND GENERAL LEGAL FORMAS, Com-

prising Precedents for Ordinary Use, and Clauses Adapted
to Special and Unusual Cases. With Practical Notes, by
LEONARD A. JONES.
Fourth Edition. Boston and New
York. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1894.
The first edition of Mr. JONES'S work made its appearance
about seven years ago. - Only last year we expressed our
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admiration for the book on the publication of the third edition.
That the fourth is already before us is sufficient evidence of its
success.
A book of legal forms is perhaps not essential to the libraryof an old practitioner, but to any law library it is a convenient
addition, and to a young and inexperienced member of the
profession an invaluable aid, for it saves him much time and
may save him many mistakes. Of course, it is upon its being
practical and absolutely accurate that the value of any book
of forms depend. It must contain models of all documents
included in its subject that a lawyer finds himself called upon
to draft. The field of conveyancing is a broad one, extending,.
as it does, from the simplest deed or argument to the most
involved will or complicated mortgage.
Mr. JONES'S work fulfils its mission. It gives us the forms
of conveyance of every kind which the various states prescribe,
or their courts sanction. These are well suited to the practitioner's needs. The precedents are skilfully and carefully
prepared.
The general arrangement is admirable. Foot notes call
attention to variations in the different states from the forms.
given, with references to the state laws.
W. S. E.
We owe an apology to the publishers of the General Digest
of the United States, the Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing
Company, Limited, for a misstatement of fact in our review of
that work, which appeared in the February number of the
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW. We stated that the
cascs which were printed in small type, which were apparently
notes to the other reported cases, were not, as notes, very
useful. We mistook the character of these small cases, which
were printed in small type. They are bye-report cases. Our
criticism, therefore, to these cases as notes was a criticism on
an entire misconception of the nature of the cases. Undoubtedly bye-reports are useful in i Digest. It is also a good idea
to print them in small type, so that one can immediately
discern whether the principle annunciated is one which has the
authority of a court of the last resort.

